Bear Pit: now the sole domicile of politics at LuLa

[digitaldog]

The guy has like 30 days, he has lost his mind, you can't make this up:

Donald Trump decreed on Monday that all new US federal buildings should be “beautiful”, in a long-expected executive order which excoriated architectural modernism but stopped short of demanding that all such projects should be in the classical style.

[BernardLanguillier]

Under Occam's razor, the simplest explanation need not be simple. Indeed, it can be complex. Some people miss that. Echoing that, Einstein said:

“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”

Certainly but again, Occam’s razor doesn’t even state that the simpler explanation is always the right one, merely that it is in a majority of cases.

It’s therefore a well formed statement that is applicable to itself.

Cheers,
Bernard

[faberryman]

The guy has like 30 days, he has lost his mind, you can't make this up:

Yeah, he wants everything to be in the style of Louis XIV. Have you seen pictures of the inside of his three story apartment in Trump Tower? Holy moly, where did he get all of that stuff. Maybe a dumpster at Versailles? I even heard that he was going to install a Hall of Mirrors in the White House once they take down the Christmas decorations.

[digitaldog]

Speaking of Hall of Mirrors, back to movies, towards the end of Citizen Kane, there's an amazing shot of Kane walking through one. Of course, in terms of Cinematography, the entire film is startling even by today's standards.

[BernardLanguillier]

Some comments regarding what's been posted here regarding the recent SolarWinds cyberattack. I am most definitely not an expert in these matters; but have read some of what people who are experts have written.

- Who did it and the methods employed for attribution of the attack to Russia: No—it wasn't based on anything as simple as tracing an IP address. Those were faked and appeared as legitimate trusted IP addresses that each of the individually hacked networks used routinely. The attribution is based on things previously observed from known sources of attack, such as: techniques used; established methods and tactics of intrusion, code deployment, and detection evasion; the operational capabilities required and displayed in those things previously mentioned; and examination of the embedded malicious code for fingerprints or traces of known code attributes which point to a specific source. Expert cybersecurity investigators, in both the private and government sectors, say this hack points to a very specific Russian government actor. It was first detected by FireEye, a prominent global cybersecurity company, who was itself attacked and compromised.

- Who was targeted: First, companies that are a major part of the infrastructure backbone of network communication and security. Among the initial targets were major companies in the supply of widely used products for building secure networks: SolarWinds (systems management and monitoring for networks and security); FireEye (cybersecurity and network protection); and Microsoft (network systems and security applications). Those targets and more were not just penetrated; they had products and services infected with malicious code and/or cybersecurity defense, detection tools, and methods compromised. This went on for several months before being detected. SolarWinds was the entry point for infecting the other initial targets because their products and services are so widely used that it enabled intrusion across the supply chain of other critical network component suppliers.

- Why they were the first targets: The first companies targeted are part of a chain of trusted network links that form a security foundation relied on for day-to-day network operations across a landscape of businesses, institutions, and government agencies. They are used both for local network control and security and trusted secure network communication between those entities. FireEye, for example, provides cybersecurity software and services for cloud services, financial services, government, healthcare, and industrial control infrastructure.

- Second stage targets: Critical businesses and institutions that utilize and rely on the products and services from the first stage targets for their network integrity and communications.

- Classified government information: There is no indication or likelihood that any highly classified government documents were the target of the attack. Highly classified government information isn't stored in ways that are vulnerable to internet intrusion for obvious reasons. Lower levels of confidential information would have lower levels of security. For the higher classification levels a human source inside an agency would be needed for any espionage attempts.

- The purpose and what information was obtained: It's still too early to tell. Given what is known it would appear to be a project that successfully obtained intrusion, knowledge, and insight into a framework of common cybersecurity and network infrastructure across very specific sectors and targets. Beyond that, it will take months of investigation to determine what was accessed and gather together detailed information on the specifics of the attack. Some of this may not be revealed publicly for a very long time due to security concerns of the companies and agencies involved or to avoid adverse publicity.

- Why it's of concern: First, the breadth and depth of the attack. Second, that it remained undetected for so long. Third, the narrowly focused targets of the attack. This was not your ordinary front door cyberattack on a single network to obtain some trade secrets or financial gain. It was specifically targeted at critical network security components and the companies that provide them to other companies and institutions, who rely on them as part of their network infrastructure for day-to-day operations.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/12/russias-hacking-frenzy-is-a-reckoning/

The longer range goal of the attack, though still not clear, is still concerning. Russia has been stepping up their abilities to undermine essential infrastructures as illustrated in this article.

https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/

How an Entire Nation Became Russia's Test Lab for Cyberwar. Blackouts in Ukraine were just a trial run. Russian hackers are learning to sabotage infrastructure and the US could be next.

I am sure that all experts are 100% right that the technique used is very similar, or probably even identical, to that used by a specific Russian gov entity.

How do experts know? Because it’s reasonably well documented. Once this is said you understand that it’s possible for another entity to mimic this technique to make us think Russians did it, right?

China, right wing US entities unhappy about the weak stance of Trump against Russia willing to provide Biden with no choice but to toughen the play. This is highly plausible I am afraid. Just patriots willing to correct a situation putting the US at risk.

Just like a bomb attack after which traces of Russian explosives that were conveniently found on the site must mean that the Russian are responsible. We don’t have any historical precedent of planted evidence or of attempt to designate a wrong perpetrator...

Cheers,
Bernard


Cheers,
Bernard

[digitaldog]

How do experts know? Because it’s reasonably well documented. Once this is said you understand that it’s possible for another entity to mimic this technique to make us think Russians did it, right?

They know, because of their expertise and through peer review of other experts.
To the untrained eye, to the layman, two different fingerprints may look the same. A fingerprint expert can tell if they differ or not.
People who are not experts and question multiple experts without a lick of proof to why they question experts should be ignored. Especially when their disbelief confirmation bias has absolutely zero proof or expertise to form that bias.
Experts can be wrong. It takes other experts to show this, not armchair amateurs who haven't a clue about the topic.   

[BernardLanguillier]

They know, because of their expertise and through peer review of other experts.
To the untrained eye, to the layman, two different fingerprints may look the same. A fingerprint expert can tell if they differ or not.
People who are not experts and question multiple experts without a lick of proof to why they question experts should be ignored. Especially when their disbelief confirmation bias has absolutely zero proof or expertise to form that bias.
Experts can be wrong. It takes other experts to show this, not armchair amateurs who haven't a clue about the topic.   

You are missing my point.

I am not questioning at all the conclusion of experts, I am sure they are right when they say that a Russian approach was used for this hack.

All I am saying is that since there is apparently no direct evidence, they draw their conclusions based on an analysis of the method used. And they compare this method to the well documented method used by the Russian govenement. Since it matches, they claim the Russians did.

Correct so far?

My point is that the very fact that the method used by the Russians is well documented means that non Russians could use this same method also.

Any logical fallacy here?

If I am correct then all it takes is for an entity interested in blaming the Russians is to mimic their hacking techniques.

Cheers,
Bernard

[digitaldog]

My point is that the very fact that the method used by the Russians is well documented means that non Russians could use this same method also.

Any logical fallacy here?

Cheers,
Bernard

Yeah, for one, well documented, you are certain? Where?

[BernardLanguillier]

Yeah, for one, well documented, you are certain? Where?

Well enough documented that both state and private experts in the US reached the same conclusion right?

No, it's not on wikipedia, but it appears to be reasonnably well know in hacking communities, these very same communities where a perpetrator would be coming from if I were right.

Cheers,
Bernard

[digitaldog]

Well enough documented that both state and private experts in the US reached the same conclusion right?

Right you ask. You don't know yet you told us it was a fact:

My point is that the very fact that the method used by the Russians is well documented

Documented where?
And what about the possibility that agencies in our government like CISA, FBI etc have methods that are highly classified?
You subscribe to ”Russia Hacking Monthly” magazine and know about these factual and published methods or maybe you wish to drop this massive line of assumptions about cyber forensics.
"Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence."-Carl Sagan
Got any evidence? Lay it out for us please.

[TechTalk]

Hacking attribution does not rely only on the technical methods that I mentioned earlier, but those would be the ones most likely shared within the IT and cybersecurity communities and publicly acknowledged. One of the other primary methods of attribution is from intelligence operations conducted by the U.S. and its allies.

Intelligence operations used in attribution run the full gamut, from human assets to electronic and digital surveillance and monitoring activities. These are much less likely to be publicly acknowledged. An example of a rare public disclosure...

"More information was revealed about Dutch intelligence services which were tracking the Russian hacking group ‘Cozy Bear’ at least between 2014 and 2015. Hackers from the domestic Dutch intelligence agency AIVD were able to witness and monitor the launch of cyberattacks against the Democratic National Committee because they had access to the network from which this operation was launched. AIVD also had access to security cameras monitoring the offices from which those attacks were conducted, conveniently allowing them to compare the pictures taken with those of known spies. This operation is likely responsible for the strongest proof of a Russian cyber aggression that has ever been obtained and found its way into the public sphere."

https://www.jstor.org/Spotting the bear - Chapter 3: credible attribution and Russian operations in cyberspace.pdf

Also, attribution is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle and often takes time. There are varying levels of confidence that are used by experts and officials in discussing attribution ranging from not plausible to near certainty and they carefully choose their words. What they are often unwilling to publicly state are all of the methods used to reach their confidence level.

[TechTalk]

For an interesting documentary on the Russian hacking and cyber campaign during the lead-up to the 2016 election, I strongly recommend the recent HBO 2-part documentary Agents of Chaos. It is a fascinating look at their efforts and methods. It shows some of the the Dutch intelligence service's video surveillance of the hackers at work.

https://www.youtube.com/Agents of Chaos (2020): Official Trailer | HBO

https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/sep/22/agents-of-chaos-alex-gibney-trump-russia-film

[Peter McLennan]

Okay, so here is the news item of the day. If you scroll down the article a little ways there is a video of Kimberly Guilfoyle, Don Jr.'s main squeeze, purportedly dancing, but it looks like she is just shaking her you know what around, which given the size of her you know what, is no small feat. So this is how part of the "dance" is described:...

Meanwhile, on another stage somewhere, the other half of that dynamic duo.  Junior at his despicable best.  er, worst.

https://youtu.be/7lfBweU9KVM

[Robert Roaldi]

My favorite Nicholas Rea film is a film noir he directed called In a Lonely Place with Humphrey Bogart and Gloria Graham. I haven't seen any of his films done after the 1950s.  I'll see if I can track down Citizen X. You can't go wrong with a a movie about a serial murderer in the Soviet Union.

Update:

I found it on YouTube so I'll watch it tonight if I am not to tired after watching Season 2, Episode 6 of The Mandalorian.

Turns out the detective is played by Stephen Rae, an Irish actor, no relation to Nicolas Rae, but since it has Max Von Sydow and Donald Sutherland in it I am going to watch it.

Yes sorry, discovered that it was Stephen Rae just before reading your post. Don't know why i thought I could remember an actor's name without looking it up. I don't usually get it right.

[Robert Roaldi]

Such a diagnosis would be very good news for Chase, but also her colleagues in the Virginia General Assembly. Chase, a far-right Republican and 2021 gubernatorial candidate, refuses to wear a mask during government session, forcing her at times to sit alone in a plexiglass quarantine box that she calls “the square of freedom.”

Sorry, but when I read this, all I could think of was the "cone of silence" from Get Smart.

[Robert Roaldi]

Meanwhile, on another stage somewhere, the other half of that dynamic duo.  Junior at his despicable best.  er, worst.

https://youtu.be/7lfBweU9KVM

That delivery of meaningless sneering verbiage reminds more than anything of tele-evangelist sermons. Rambling and incoherent, never really completing a thought, but using canned phrases that people expect to hear. He doesn't have the cadence of the best of them, but he is better than his father who is truly a terrible public speaker.

[BernardLanguillier]

Hacking attribution does not rely only on the technical methods that I mentioned earlier, but those would be the ones most likely shared within the IT and cybersecurity communities and publicly acknowledged. One of the other primary methods of attribution is from intelligence operations conducted by the U.S. and its allies.

Intelligence operations used in attribution run the full gamut, from human assets to electronic and digital surveillance and monitoring activities. These are much less likely to be publicly acknowledged. An example of a rare public disclosure...

"More information was revealed about Dutch intelligence services which were tracking the Russian hacking group ‘Cozy Bear’ at least between 2014 and 2015. Hackers from the domestic Dutch intelligence agency AIVD were able to witness and monitor the launch of cyberattacks against the Democratic National Committee because they had access to the network from which this operation was launched. AIVD also had access to security cameras monitoring the offices from which those attacks were conducted, conveniently allowing them to compare the pictures taken with those of known spies. This operation is likely responsible for the strongest proof of a Russian cyber aggression that has ever been obtained and found its way into the public sphere."

https://www.jstor.org/Spotting the bear - Chapter 3: credible attribution and Russian operations in cyberspace.pdf

Also, attribution is like putting together a jigsaw puzzle and often takes time. There are varying levels of confidence that are used by experts and officials in discussing attribution ranging from not plausible to near certainty and they carefully choose their words. What they are often unwilling to publicly state are all of the methods used to reach their confidence level.

Yes, this is of course possible and would strongly increase the credibility of the current claims.

Cheers,
Bernard

[Alan Klein]

Would you like to re-evaluate this statement? Is there a limit of one nation at a time that is allowed to be an aggressive adversary of the United States?

Shouldn't the United States keep its eyes on all of its adversaries? Why is Russia excluded from your mind as a major threat? If "It's the Chinese who are the problem" are Iran and North Korea also no longer a part of "the problem" for U.S. security along with Russia? Should we not keep our eye on them as well?

Russia is economically the size of maybe South Korea or Spain.  China's #2 and will surpass America soon.  They already have more ships than America and are producing carriers at an alarming rate.  They've taken over so much of our industry and the rest of the world.  And Xi regime is dictatorial and not very pleasant.  He intends to capture and have major influence throughout the world.  Russia's just a troublesome pest.  But they're an internal mess compared to China. In this century I see China as our main adversary militarily, economically, and politically.  The Covid virus is just an insult on top of everything else.  Because of the anti-Trump drumbeat, we've kept our eyes on Russia for five years and are now finally seeing that our main adversary is China, maybe too late.  No one is saying we don't have other nations we have problems with.  But it's China who's the main problem.   Russia is a sideshow, as is Iran and North Korea.

[John Camp]

As to the identification of hackers, I am not in any way conversant with real computer languages, except they seem to be in some away, **languages.** In addition to being a thriller writer, I am a longtime thriller reader and enthusiast. There has been a trend lately in mid-list (accomplished) authors taking over the books of deceased best-sellers, like the Robert Parker "Spenser" series. These writers are very good, but I can tell within a page that Parker didn't write whatever post-mortem book we're talking about. I can't even explain it, but I know. Recently, the author Lee Child, who writes the "Reacher" novels, turned the series over to his brother, with whom he is apparently quite close. His  brother is a talented writer himself, and the first Reacher book by Lee's brother was pretty good, but I could tell it wasn't written by Lee, and I could tell within the first few paragraphs. I know many people, thriller enthusiasts, who can do the same thing, or who will tell me at bookstore appearances that something in such and such a book of mine didn't seem quite like me. And when I look, they're inevitably right. It was me, but not in good form.

I suspect the same is true of code writers. They have a style, a feel, a way of doing things that other experts, who are familiar with them and have studied them, can tell that (say) the Russians are doing it, simply because of style. And style and feel are extremely hard to duplicate, or mimic. In thriller novels, it even comes down to the *spacing* you use between sections. Or the fact that somebody like James Patterson writes short snappy chapters, and somebody like John Connelly doesn't. So, I think it's quite possible that cyber experts could pick out Russians purely on feel.

[TechTalk]

Would you like to re-evaluate this statement?

Russia is a sideshow, as is Iran and North Korea.

In other words, no, you wouldn't like to re-evaluate.